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Abstract
Whether people believe that tax burdens are fairly distributed is an important condition
for welfare state legitimacy. This article examines how people evaluate this distribution
of tax burdens in their country by using latent cluster analysis. We use 2006
International Social Survey Program data for 26 countries and define different ‘‘tax
opinion profiles’’ for individuals based on their evaluation of tax burdens of different
income groups. We find six groups of individuals with typically different ‘‘tax opinion
profiles,’’ among which are profiles favoring more progressive taxes, expressing
contentedness with present taxes, or showing opposition to all taxes. People’s member-
ship of profile groups is related to their class position, political affiliation, education,
and trust, as well as to characteristics of their country’s tax system.
In 1975, Harold Wilensky was one of the first to predict a backlash of welfare
support as a result of the so-called ‘‘tax squeeze’’ of the middle class who
carried the lion’s share of the increasing costs of the welfare state. He pointed
to the fact that perceptions of a fair distribution of tax burdens are of great
importance for the legitimacy of the welfare state. Rothstein (1998, p. 163)
even argued that a broadly shared perception of a ‘‘just distribution of tax
burdens’’ is a necessary condition for the welfare state to be legitimate.
Not without reason, many scholars investigated attitudes about taxes. From
the 1970s onward, there is a broad range of (especially American) literature that
studies opposition against local and federal taxes and so-called tax revolts (e.g.,
Bartels, 2005; Citrin, 1979; Kornhauser, 1994; Svallfors, 2011). Other tax attitude
All correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Femke Roosma, Department of Sociology,
Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail: f.roosma@uvt.nl
 International Journal of Public Opinion Research Advance Access published August 24, 2015
 by guest on A
ugust 26, 2015
http://ijpor.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
studies debate issues like tax conciousness, incoherent attitudes about taxes and
government spending, and non-atittudes about taxes (Dornstein, 1987; Edlund,
2003; Eriksen & Fallan, 1996; Winter & Mouritzen, 2001). Only a couple
of studies focus on the question of whether taxes are fairly distributed among
different income groups (Bernasconi, 2006; Confalonieri & Newton, 1995;
Edlund, 1999). And although it is argued that perceptions of the just distribution
of taxes are important indicators of welfare state legitimacy (Rothstein, 1998;
Wilensky, 1975), this issue has hardly been addressed in the welfare attitude
literature. In contrast, welfare attitudes about a fair ‘‘doling out’’ or allocation
of the yields of the redistribution are widely studied and discussed. For instance,
there are several studies that examine deservingness perceptions of individuals
regarding who is entitled to benefits and for what reasons (Jeene, Van Oorschot,
& Uunk, 2013; Slothuus, 2007; Van Oorschot, 2000; 2006). And many studies
examine attitudes about the scope of welfare benefits: Should states spend more
or less on welfare benefits, and should the middle class be included in the
redistribution schemes (Brooks & Manza, 2006; Korpi & Palme, 1998)? Yet, as
Van Oorschot (2013) accurately states, there is less focus on attitudes toward the
other side of the redistribution coin: the contribution side. Do people believe that
contributions to the welfare state are distributed in a fair manner?
Previous studies that empirically examined attitudes about the social
distribution of taxes generally found that people want more progressive
taxes. We believe that these studies underutilized the available data: They
describe the overall or average opinion in society. Here, instead, we aim to
optimize the use of empirical data by revealing the diverse opinions toward the
distribution of taxes and, additionally, by explaining why these opinions are
different. We formulate the following research questions: (1) What different
opinions about the distribution of taxes can we distinguish from the literature?
(2) What groups of individuals with opinions about the distribution of taxes
can we empirically distinguish? (3) How can we explain differences in opinions
about the distribution of tax burdens?
We apply latent class cluster analysis to International Social Survey
Program (ISSP) 2006 data for 26 countries to assess whether the qualitatively
different tax opinions that we identify in the literature can be found among
substantial proportions of individuals in the data. Thereafter we relate these
profiles to respondents’ social class position, political affiliation, and education,
as well as to characteristics of national tax systems such as the total tax
burden, tax progressivity, and visibility.
From Tax Revolts to a Just Distribution of Tax Burdens
Tax attitudes have been studied in different disciplines and from different
perspectives. In the history of the welfare state and taxation policies, the 1970s
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are marked as a decade of ‘‘tax revolts’’ because, at that moment, almost all
individuals were involved in the tax system and income taxes were historically
high (Confalonieri & Newton, 1995; Steinmo, 2003). Policy makers responded
to these warning signs of tax revolts with major tax reforms. Because it was
argued that the visibility of taxes increased public discontent (Hibbs &
Madsen, 1981; Wilensky, 1975), welfare states started to rely more on less
visible taxes as value added tax (VAT) and corporate taxes (Brys, Owens, &
Matthews, 2011; Confalonieri & Newton, 1995; Steinmo, 2003). From that
period onward, there has been much attention to studying the increasing
opposition against taxes among the public (Bartels, 2005; Blendon, Pelletier,
Rosenbaum, & Brodie, 2003; Citrin, 1979; Kornhauser, 1994). Some scholars
focused particularly on a specific group that was supposed to bear the heaviest
burden of the increasing welfare costs: the middle class. Losing the welfare
support of the middle class because they felt that their tax burden is grossly
unfair could imply erosion of the legitimacy of the welfare state (Korpi &
Palme, 1998; Wilensky, 1975).
The large-scale opposition against taxes, irrespective of the fact that people
benefit from them or not, puzzled scholars. Scholars suggested that people are
misinformed about taxes, have a low tax consciousness, or carry mispercep-
tions about taxes and tax systems (Citrin, 1979; Dornstein, 1987; Edlund,
2003; Eriksen & Fallan, 1996; Winter & Mouritzen, 2001). In particular, the
fact that people support increased social spending and oppose tax increases led
scholars to conclude that ‘‘people want something for nothing’’ (Citrin, 1979,
p. 113; see also Winter & Mouritzen, 2001). Others argue that people are not
naı¨ve, but rather they simply want to shift the burden to someone else or
make the tax system fairer. And, although they support progressive redistri-
bution in general, people have different ideas about how progressive the tax
system should be in practice (Edlund, 2003).
Also, Confalonieri and Newton (1995) suggest that for understanding tax
attitudes we should differentiate between fundamental and procedural atti-
tudes toward taxation. People have a fundamental opinion about the basic
principle of the system; for instance, they can support progressive taxation
or a flat-tax for all citizens. But they also have an opinion about the procedural
implementation of the taxes: Is the system progressive enough and are the tax
rates high enough? In general, there is strong support for the idea that people
with higher incomes should pay higher taxes, but people do not automatically
believe this progressive system is applied in the right manner (Confalonieri &
Newton, 1995). The question of whether people feel the progressive principle
is applied in a right manner is of high relevance for welfare state legitimacy.
Rothstein (1998) argues that, to be legitimate, the welfare state should meet
the condition of a just distribution of burdens: People should believe that they
carry a fair share in the costs of the programs and that others do the same
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(Rothstein, 1998). If, instead, there is a tax culture in which everyone tries to
take a free ride, people feel less morally obliged to pay taxes (Kahan, 2005).
To our knowledge, there are only a few empirical cross-national studies
that examine these perceptions of a just distribution of burdens (Bernasconi,
2006; Confalonieri & Newton, 1995; Edlund, 1999). These studies all use the
same three dependent variables from multiple waves of the ISSP that ask
whether people feel that taxes for high-income groups, middle-income
groups, or low-income groups are (much) too low, about right, or (much)
too high. These studies show that people are critical toward the distribution
of tax burdens in their country because they believe that taxes for high-income
individuals are too low, while low- and middle-income groups pay too much
in taxes. But these studies (based on 1987, 1992, 1996 data) are limited to only
a couple of countries (with exception of Bernasconi, 2006) and therefore have
limited comparative scope. Moreover, we believe that these studies under-
utilized the available data: They show the average public attitude by reporting
the overall percentages of opinions toward the tax burdens of different income
groups, but not the variation of opinions in the population (Confalonieri &
Newton, 1995; Edlund, 1999). Alternatively, Bernasconi (2006) presents all
combinations of attitudes on the three items and combines them in couples
manually. This is an inefficient way of dealing with the data compared with
revealing the more common response patterns. Also, it might lead to error
because the combinations of attitudes are merged by the researcher and are not
based on underlying response patterns in the data. Therefore we opt for an
alternative analytical strategy in which we apply latent class cluster analysis to
find different clusters or groups of individuals with different tax attitudes (or
‘‘tax opinion profiles’’) in the data. These clusters are based on common
response patterns of individuals toward the three items measuring opinions
about the tax burden of three income groups. With this method, we can study
these items in relation to each other and detect substantial groups of individ-
uals with related response patterns. Also, it allows us to examine why these
groups evaluate the distribution of tax burdens differently.
Explaining Differences in Tax Opinions
Building on hypotheses derived from previous research, we formulate our
expectations regarding the variety of opinions toward the distribution of tax
burdens. First, as progressive taxes are supported by a large majority of the
public (Bernasconi, 2006; Confalonieri & Newton, 1995; Edlund, 1999), we
expect to find at least a strong progressive cluster in which people express that
they find taxes for high-income groups to be too low and taxes for low-income
groups to be too high. Second, based on the literature about tax revolts, we
expect that there are people who oppose all taxes and regard taxes for all
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income groups to be too high (Bartels, 2005; Citrin, 1979). This opposition
might be related to the strong ideological belief that a government is not
allowed to tax its citizens. Third, we expect that, as Wilensky (1975)
predicted, a certain proportion of the population will believe that taxes for
middle-income groups are too high and see an overburdened middle class.
Finally, we expect that some people are satisfied with the tax current system,
as is found by Bernasconi (2006).
Next, we distinguish four factors that explain why people evaluate the
distribution of tax burdens in different ways. First, political economic theories
on tax attitudes suggest that people will support a certain distribution of tax
burdens as long as they are net beneficiaries from the redistribution policies
(Heinemann & Hennighausen, 2010). As Meltzer and Richard argue (1981),
people with an income below the median income favor higher taxes and more
redistribution, while people with an income above the median income demand
lower taxes and less redistribution. Several studies found evidence for the
hypothesized effect of self-interest and/or class interest (Dornstein, 1987;
Edlund, 1999; Hite & Roberts, 1991). Therefore, we expect that people in
lower social strata find taxes for low-income groups to be too high, while
people in higher social strata find taxes for middle- or high-income groups
to be too high. Because there might be a dispersion between the measured
social class position and the perceived social class position (Heinemann &
Hennighausen, 2010), we expect that people who regard themselves to be in
a lower position can be found in a progressive cluster, whereas people who
regard themselves as being in a higher social position are in an overburdened
middle-class cluster.
Second, political or ideological convictions can also explain how people
think about the distribution of tax burden among different income groups.
Taxes ‘‘are loaded with political symbolism’’ (Confalonieri & Newton, 1995,
p. 121). Political parties use a variety of proposals to alter the tax system to
explicate their political philosophies of libertarianism to egalitarianism.
Therefore, tax attitudes are strongly ideological: Where left-wing parties
draw strongly on the ‘‘ability-to-pay’’ principle (higher taxes for those who
can afford them), right-wing parties reject high taxes among all income groups
and among the middle class in particular (Confalonieri & Newton, 1995). We
therefore expect that left-wing affiliation is directly related to more progressive
tax attitudes and right-wing affiliation is directly related to a propensity for tax
revolt, or rather, to the perception of an overburdened middle class.
Third, theories about the foundations of social and economic cooperation
hypothesize that people are conditional co-operators: They are willing to
contribute to collective redistribution only if they trust others doing the
same (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2005; Gintis, Bowels, Boyd, & Fehr, 2005). We
expect that people with higher social trust are more willing to pay taxes, and
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thus to not oppose all taxes. More social trust might also lead to more
satisfaction with the distribution of taxes because people are more likely to
believe that everybody pays their share.
Finally, next to self-interest, ideological ideas, and foundations of social
cooperation, we hypothesize that increased knowledge about the tax system
makes people more content with the current distribution of taxes (Eriksen &
Fallan, 1996). Misperceptions about the procedural implementation of funda-
mental tax principles could lead to dissatisfaction (Confalonieri & Newton, 1995).
Being better informed about this could alter people’s tax opinions and explain
variation between different tax opinions (Eriksen & Fallan, 1996). Although
educational background might only be an indirect and not very effective measure
of knowledge of the tax system, we expect that higher educated individuals are
more content with the current tax system and less opposed to all taxes.
Attitudes about the distribution of taxes might, of course, also be
influenced by the tax system in so-called policy feedback effects (Pierson,
2001). And because countries differ substantially in their tax policies (Brys
et al., 2011), tax attitudes might be differently affected. The institutional
characteristics of the tax system can therefore be important factors in explain-
ing individual differences in tax attitudes. We hypothesize three effects. First,
the amount of taxes collected is important, that is, the so-called tax burden.
In countries with a higher overall tax burden, people might feel that they pay
too much and see that others pay too much as well. We expect that a higher
tax burden in a country would therefore lead to higher tax revolt and less
contentedness with the tax system in general. Second, in evaluating opinions
about the distribution of tax burdens, the progressiveness of the taxes is an
important aspect (Edlund, 1999; Paturot, Mellbye, & Brys, 2013; Whiteford,
2008). Progressive taxes can refer to the redistributive effect of the systems
caused by higher tax rates (mostly found in the Nordic countries; Edlund,
1999) or to the actual progressiveness of the tax system (Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries have the most progressive tax systems; Whiteford, 2008). In the latter
case, when the level of inequality in taxable income is taken into account, the
effective progressiveness will be greater in countries with a more unequal
distribution of taxable income (Whiteford, 2008). We expect that in countries
with less effective progressive tax systems, there is a higher demand for more
progressive redistribution. Third, the visibility of the type of taxes countries
use influences differences in tax attitudes. The less visible taxes are, the
stronger the willingness to contribute (Hibbs & Madsen, 1981; Steinmo,
1993; Wilensky, 1975). Personal income and property tax are regarded to be
the most visible taxes, while VAT and employer’s taxes are less visible
(Edlund, 1999). In countries that rely less on personal income tax (PIT),
people might be more satisfied with the current distribution of taxes.
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Data and Methods
Data
As in previous research, we use data from the ISSP for the year 2006 (wave
Role of Government IV). The ISSP program provides individual survey data
collected by face-to-face interviews or self-completed surveys of representative
samples of the population of a broad range of countries. For more detailed
information see the ISSP Study Monitoring (Scholz, Faa, Harkness, &
Heller, 2008). Our data set contains 36,688 individuals for the 26 welfare
states that we selected: Australia (AU), Canada (CA), Croatia (HR), Czech
Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (GE),
Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), Japan (JP), South Korea (KR), Latvia
(LV), the Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO), Poland (PL),
Portugal (PT), Russia (RU), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE),
Switzerland (CH), Great Britain (GB), and the United States (US). In
Table A1, we present the number of respondents per country. This survey
contains three items about individual’s perceptions of the tax burden of three
different income groups in their country. All these items are measured on a
5-point scale. The survey question is stated as, ‘‘Generally, how would you
describe taxes in [country] today? We mean all taxes together, including national
insurance, income tax, VAT and all the rest. For those with [high/middle/low]
incomes taxes are: (much) too low, about right, (much) too high.’’ The combined
answers to these three questions sketch the respondents’ opinions toward the
distribution of tax burdens among different income groups. The question
explicates the different types of taxes including social security contributions.
This is important in the context of welfare legitimacy, because for several
countries social security contributions are the main source funding the welfare
state.
We use the following individual-level variables. To measure self-interest
and class interest, we use three indicators: the respondents’ relative income
position, social class position, and subjective social position in society. First,
we compute a comparative measure of people’s relative income position in
their country. We use an item measuring per country people’s family income
on an 11-point scale in the country’s currency. The categories show a range of
annual income, of which we take the mean income position as an indicator.
We convert these categories to purchasing power parities for 2006 using
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) statistics
and divide this by a weight for the household composition. Next, we stand-
ardize the results to make them comparable across countries. This results in a
comparative measure of relative household income measuring the respondents’
relative income position in their country. This variable has minimum score
of 2.05 and a maximum score of 29.90. To improve interpretability, this
variable was divided in to three dummy variables: high income position
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(respondents with a relative income in the top 25%), low income position
(in the bottom 25%) and middle income position (between 25 and 75%). We
use the middle income position as a reference category. Occupational class was
measured using Goldthorpe’s international comparable occupational class
scheme (EGP class scheme) (Erikson, Goldthorpe, & Portocarero, 1979).
The occupational categories are based on the International Standard
Classification of Occupations (ISCO88) (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, & Treiman,
1992). To convert these codes into the EGP class scheme, we used conversion
tools provided by Ganzeboom and Treiman (2013). We follow Svallfors (1997)
in a six-version categorization of the EGP class scheme distinguishing unskilled
workers, skilled workers, routine non-manual employees, self-employed, lower ser-
vice class, and higher service class. We use routine non-manual employees as
reference category. For the subjective measure of social class position, we use
the top-bottom item (10-point scale): ‘‘In our society there are groups which
tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be toward the bottom.
Where would you put yourself on this scale?’’ The objective and subjective
class measures negatively correlate, r¼.26 (taking the EGP class variable as
a six-point scale).
For ideological affiliation, we use a derived ISSP measure of left or right
party affiliation based on the respondent’s given party preference. This
measure distinguished the following categories: far left, left/center left,
center/liberal, right/conservative, far right, other/no specific, and no party/
no preference. We merged this variable into four categories: left wing (far left,
left/center left), middle (center/liberal), right wing (right/conservative, far
right), and no preference/other (other/no specific, no party/no preference).
We use left wing as a reference category. Because this variable was not avail-
able for Israel, we had to exclude Israel from the part of the analysis in which
we relate covariates to the latent clusters.
For the respondents’ education, we use a derived ordinal measure of
educational attainment that has six categories: no formal qualification, lowest
formal qualification, above lowest qualification, higher secondary completed,
above higher secondary level, and university degree completed. To measure
social trust, we make a scale of the following two items (Cronbach’s
alpha¼ 0.69) asking to what extent the respondent agrees or disagrees with:
‘‘There are only a few people that I can trust completely’’ and ‘‘If you are not
careful, other people will take advantage of you’’ (scale is 1–5). Finally we add
two control variables gender (male is reference category) and age.
For the country-level covariates, we use first a measure of tax burden called
fiscal freedom for the year 2005 from data provided by The Heritage
Foundation. This measure includes three components that are weighted
equally: the top tax rate on individual income, the top tax rate on corporate
income, and the total tax burden as a percentage of Gross domestic product
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(GDP). Countries can have a score between 0 and 100, with a higher score
meaning a higher fiscal freedom and a lower tax burden. To better interpret
this variable, we reversed the scale.
For the second variable tax progressivity, we use data provided by the
OECD stat database on taxing wages. We follow Oishi, Schimmack, and
Diener (2012) in using a measure of ‘‘effective’’ progressive taxation by cal-
culating the difference between the effective wage taxation for individuals on
67% of the national averaging wage and individuals on 167% of the national
average tax wage. We measure the effective tax rate by the 2005 indicator:
‘‘Increase in net income after an increase of 1 currency unit in gross wages
(%).’’ Unfortunately, this variable was not available for Croatia, Latvia, or
Russia.
The third variable measures tax visibility. We use the tax revenue of PIT
as a percentage of the total tax revenue in 2008, because PIT is seen as the
most visible tax (Brys et al., 2011). This variable was not available for Croatia
or Latvia.
Finally, we use GDP per capita in purchasing power parities provided by
the World Bank as a control variable. Because we have only between 22 and 25
countries (Israel is excluded because of missing data on the individual level),
we cannot include many second-level covariates. We argue that controlling for
the wealth of the country is most effective, because wealth is associated with
many other country-level characteristics that might be relevant for tax atti-
tudes such as social spending, benefit generosity, corruption, and social trust.
Methods
We use latent cluster analysis (LCA) to identify groups of individuals with dif-
ferent perceptions toward taxes for different income groups in their country.
In this method, the response pattern of a respondent toward the three selected
items determines the chance of an individual being in a certain latent cluster.
Individuals with related response patterns are in the same cluster. The cluster
can be interpreted as a segment of people with a specific ‘‘opinion profile’’
toward the distribution of tax burdens in a country. Because we are interested
in people’s opinions toward a set of three items, we believe that LCA is the
best way to analyze these items in relation to each other, and, at the same
time, find differences in response patterns.
After identifying the different latent classes that characterize different
segments of individuals with related opinion profiles, we regress cluster mem-
bership on the individual- and country-level characteristics. We use the three-
step procedure, a model-based approach in which we can use the predicted
latent classes (i.e., the probability of the respondent to be in a certain latent
class) to get unbiased estimates of the relationship between cluster member-
ship and individual and contextual covariates (Bakk, Tekle, & Vermunt, 2013;
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Vermunt, 2010). We use robust standard errors because the data are clustered
by individuals in countries. Models were estimated with the program
LatentGOLD 5.0 (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005).
In particular, the variables relative household income and party affiliation
have a high amount of missing data (around 20%). We therefore use multiple
imputation to replace the missing data (Allison, 2001) according to the chained
equations procedure. In this procedure, all variables with missing data are
imputed sequentially by a regression model appropriate for the measurement
level of the variable to be imputed (Raghunathan, Lepkowski, Van Hoewyk, &
Solenberger, 2001). To take into account the clustered structure of the data,
we include country dummies in the imputation procedure (Graham, 2009).
The five imputed data sets (M¼ 5) that we generated in Stata 12 were im-
ported in LatentGOLD for the analysis of the three-step procedure (Vermunt,
Van Ginkel, Van Der Ark, & Sijtsma, 2008). We used the simultaneous option
for three-step procedure to be able to estimate the model.
Results
Six Tax Opinion Profiles
In LCA, the number of latent classes is not determined by a strict rule, but
rather by assessing fit statistics and evaluating interpretability of the models.
More parsimonious models are preferred. As a main fit statistic, we use the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which is based on the likelihood func-
tion but introduces a penalty for adding more parameters. The lower the BIC
the better the fit. We assess the reduced BIC when one class is added to the
model. After adding the fourth and the sixth cluster, we see that the BIC is
reduced less steeply. The six-cluster model, compared with the model with
four clusters, contains additional clusters that are of substantial interest. When
we add a seventh cluster, however, not much additional reduction in BIC is
observed. But more importantly, it does not improve our understanding of the
population because the new cluster is a refinement of another cluster (results
for this model are available from the first author). We therefore choose the
more parsimonious model with a low BIC and where all (six) of the clusters
are of theoretical interest. The results for this model are given in Table 1.
Before discussing the six latent clusters, we point at the overall column
that summarizes the result for the total sample. These results confirm the
conclusions of previous studies that focused on the overall opinion in the
population: On average, people want a bit more progressive taxing. They
believe high-income groups pay too few taxes, while middle- and, especially,
low-income groups pay too many taxes. Yet, as we will see, this overall picture
of the data conceals the variation in opinions: There are progressive clusters
but also other tax opinions held by individuals. We will discuss them below.
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A typical response pattern for the first cluster shows contentedness with
the level of taxes for all income groups. Remarkably, this contentedness cluster is
the largest cluster (29.2%), implying that a substantial proportion of the
population in the sampled welfare states believes that tax burdens are distrib-
uted in a fair manner. The second cluster is the best-fitting profile for 23.2%
of the respondents. The typical response pattern of individuals in this cluster
reflects the feeling that the high-income groups pay too few taxes, the low-
income groups pay too many taxes, and taxes for the middle-income
groups are about right. We call this the linear progressive cluster because the
ability-to-pay principle is applied to all three income groups. The third cluster
contains 21.1% of the population under study, and we call it the overburdened
low- and middle-class cluster. People with a typical response pattern in this
cluster feel that both the low and the middle class pay much in taxes, while
they regard the taxes of high-income groups as about right. So both middle-
and low-income groups are seen as overburdened, while high-income groups
are seen as to pay a fair share. The fourth cluster shows a response pattern in
which individuals feel that taxes for low- and middle-income groups are
too high, while taxes for high-income groups are too low. We call this clus-
ter the broad progressive cluster because individuals in this cluster believe that
high-income groups should pay more taxes, while both the middle- and the
low-income groups carry a too high tax burden. The fifth cluster has some
similarities with the third cluster. However, in this cluster only the middle
class is seen as overburdened by taxes, while taxes for high- and low-income
groups are seen as about right. There is a small tendency to find taxes for
high-income groups also too high, but this cluster stands out in its view that
the middle class pays a too high price. This cluster contains 6.2% of the
individuals and we interpret it as the overburdened middle-class cluster.
Finally, the sixth cluster shows a small group of 6.1% of the respondents
with a strong profile. Almost all individuals who are in this segment believe
that taxes for all income groups are too high. We label this cluster the tax
revolt cluster.
We conducted a measurement equivalence analysis in which we ensured
the cross-national comparability of this cluster model for the selected 26
countries. We followed Kankarasˇ, Moors, and Vermunt (2010) in estimating
a multigroup latent class cluster model for assessing the measurement invari-
ance. We estimated a range of nested models in which more and more par-
ameters are constrained to be equal over countries and assessed the model fit
(BIC). The results show that our model is partially structurally homogeneous.
In this model, the relation (slope) between the latent variable and the items is
the same across countries; one item also has the same intercept, but two items
have different intercepts in different countries. This is a relatively high level
of measurement equivalence, and on this level, comparison of country
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differences in class membership is possible (Kankarasˇ et al., 2010). Results of
this analysis are available from the first author.
We see that there are clearly different opinion profiles that show the
diversity of opinions toward the distribution of taxes. As expected, progressive
attitudes toward the distribution of taxes are strong. We distinguish two clus-
ters; one includes the middle class in the demand for a more progressive
redistribution (the broad progressive cluster) and one believes the middle
class pay a fair share (the linear progressive cluster). Although they are rela-
tively small clusters, we also find the tax revolt cluster and the overburdened
middle-class cluster that are suggested in the tax attitude literature. Table A2
presents the cluster sizes per country. This table shows that the tax revolt
cluster, the overburdened middle-class cluster, and the contentedness cluster
are relatively stronger in Anglo-Saxon countries, while the post-communist
and Mediterranean countries have a higher proportion of the population in the
progressive clusters.
Individual- and Country-Level Factors
Next, we try to explain differences in these different tax opinion profiles. Is a
particular cluster membership mostly explained by self-interest or class inter-
est, political ideology, social trust, or educational background? Table 2 shows
the results. We give an example of how to interpret the coefficients, which are
logistic coefficients and should be interpreted as factors increasing or reducing
the odds of belonging to a certain cluster. For example, the significant effect
of .585 for high-income on the overburdened middle-class cluster indicates
that having a high income, in comparison with having a middle income,
increases the odds of belonging to the overburdened middle-class cluster by
a factor of e0.585¼ 1.795 (holding all other variables constant). For people with
a high income, the chance of belonging to the overburdened middle-class
cluster is thus 79.5% higher, compared with the reference category, the
middle incomes.
When we look at the indicators of self-interest and class interest we see
that relative income, occupational class, and subjective social class all influence
tax attitude perceptions. Having a lower class position indeed increases the
likelihood to have progressive tax attitudes. In the linear and broad progressive
clusters, there are fewer people with a relatively high income and more skilled
and unskilled workers. People who believe they are ‘‘at the bottom of society’’
more often have a linear progressive response pattern. Having a higher social
class position increases the chance of being in the tax revolt or overburdened
middle-class cluster. These clusters contain more individuals with higher
incomes and from higher occupational classes. Yet, in the tax revolt cluster,
we find more people being self-employed, while in the overburdened middle-
class cluster, there are fewer self-employed individuals. The contentedness
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cluster is hardly influenced by the self-interest indicators; there is only a small
effect of individuals perceiving themselves more at ‘‘the top of society.’’ The
overburdened low- and middle-class cluster seems to contain more skilled and
unskilled individuals and lower professionals. In sum, self-interest and class
interest are important explanations for differences in opinions on the distri-
bution of taxes: Individuals in lower social class positions demand a more
progressive distribution, individuals in higher social class positions see an
overburdened middle class because they see themselves as part of that
middle class, and people in higher positions more often believe that all
taxes are too high.
As expected, there are also strong effects of political affiliation on tax
opinions. Being a member of the overburdened middle-class cluster can be
partly explained by right-wing political affiliation, while progressive tax atti-
tudes (membership of the progressive clusters) are related to left-wing political
affiliation. People who oppose all taxes are more right-wing affiliated, but this
effect is smaller than expected.
Social trust seems to be an important predictor of the contentedness clus-
ter membership. People who feel that others can be trusted are more satisfied
with the current distribution of tax burdens. High social trust strengthens the
feeling that others pay their fair share of taxes. On the contrary, low social
trust explains tax revolt, implying that people reject redistribution via taxes at
all because they do not trust others to pay their fair share.
Higher educational attainment explains being content with the distribution
of taxes, which is in line with previous research (Eriksen & Fallan, 1996), and
lower educations leads people to revolt against all taxes. This implies that
increasing knowledge about the procedural implementation of taxes could
increase the legitimacy of the tax system.
Next, we ran separate analyses including one country-level variable at the
time, controlling for GDP per capita and all individual-level variables. Table 3
shows the results.
There are only a few significant effects of the country-level covariates. We
see that if a tax burden in a country is high, there are fewer people who are
content with the current distribution of taxes. However, a high tax burden
seems not to lead to more tax revolt. Instead, it is the design of the tax system
that leads people to oppose all taxes rather than the total tax burden. Model 2
shows that in countries with more progressive tax systems, the proportion of
individuals in the tax revolt cluster is higher. Model 3 shows that tax systems
with a relatively higher share of the more visible PIT increases tax revolt, but
not contentedness as we expected. Against our expectations, less progressive
tax systems do not lead to a higher demand for more progressive taxes, but tax
visibility decreases the support for broad progressive redistribution. Although
the effects for the individual characteristics seem more convincing than the
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P U B L I C O P I N I O N R E S E A R C H16
 by guest on A
ugust 26, 2015
http://ijpor.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
contextual effects, the design of the tax system does matter. Especially the
amount of tax revolt in a country can be diminished if countries rely less on
visible taxes or progressive tax systems. A high tax burden leads to less sup-
port for taxes.
Conclusion and Discussion
With this study, we seek to find an answer to the question of whether people
believe taxes are distributed in a fair manner, and in relation to that, what the
answer means for the legitimacy of the welfare state. First of all, we conclude
that opinions toward the distribution of taxes are far more diverse than pre-
vious research has shown. There are different ideas about whether the current
distribution of taxes is fair. As found in previous research, a substantial
amount of the population believes that tax burdens should be distributed in
a more progressive manner. But, additionally to previous research, we also
find a large proportion of individuals that believes that the current distribution
of taxes is ‘‘about right.’’ The group that is relatively satisfied with the current
distribution is, in our view, remarkably high. Although there is a group of
people that opposes all taxes, which supports the tax revolt theory, this group
is marginal in every country. However, in 2006 there were still signs that
Wilensky (1975) was right: Many people still see a tax squeeze of the
middle class.
These differences in opinions can be explained by different factors. As we
hypothesized, self-interest and class interest explains why people in the higher
social strata see an overburdened middle class or oppose all taxes, while people
in the lower social strata are supportive of a more progressive distribution of
tax burdens. But additionally, the idea that tax attitudes are highly political is
Table 3
Effects of Country-Level Determinants on Each Latent Cluster—Three-Step Approach
Model Context
variable
Latent clusters
Contentedness Linear
progressive
Overburdened
low and middle
class
Broad
progressive
Overburdened
middle class
Tax
revolt
1 Tax burden 0.019*** 0.006 0.003 0.012 0.004 0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.021) (0.006)
2 Tax
progressivity
0.791 1.545 0.037 0.715 0.303 2.785**
(0.647) (1.119) (0.927) (1.472) (1.337) (1.102)
3 Tax visibility 0.004 0.015 0.001 0.033*** 0.012 0.031***
(0.005) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.011)
Note. Standard errors are between parentheses. Models control for GDP per capita in PPP. Models control
for all individual-level variables introduced (based on imputed data M¼ 5). Models exclude Israel because
political affiliation was not available for this country.
***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .10.
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found in the strong effect of political affiliation on four of the six clusters.
Clearly, tax attitudes will remain to be a point of ideological dispute within the
population, and, to some extent, there will always be a group of people that is
dissatisfied with the distribution of taxes. Our indirect measure of knowledge
about the tax system confirms our hypothesis that more knowledge about the
procedural implementation increases contentedness with the tax system. The
results imply that people are more content with their share of the tax burden
when they trust others to pay their fair share as well, and this result strength-
ens theories claiming that people are conditional co-operators. Institutional
factors influence the legitimacy of the tax system in different ways, although
the effects are smaller than expected. A high tax burden leads to less content-
edness with the distribution of taxes implying that people want to shift the
burden to someone else if taxes are too high. A specific design of the tax
system (progressive and visible taxes) induces people to oppose all taxes.
In answering the question of whether there is a just distribution of tax
burdens, we found that the LCA method has led to a more complete picture
of the diverse ideas in society about the distribution of taxes. Further research
could extend this study to more countries to be able to examine more con-
textual factors that influence tax attitudes.
Rothstein (1998) argued that a broadly shared perception of a just distri-
bution of tax burdens is a necessary condition for welfare state legitimacy. We
conclude that a substantial proportion of the population is relatively satisfied
with this distribution of burdens, although taxes remain a matter of political
dispute. Still, the tax burden of the middle class should be regarded as a threat
for welfare legitimacy because many individuals see their tax burden as too
high. Wilensky (1975) might therefore be right: A welfare state that relies
strongly on the financial contributions of the middle class can cause a backlash
of welfare legitimacy. This effect would especially occur when the middle class
does not benefit from the welfare state. Not without reason, it is argued that
universal welfare states that include the middle class in their redistribution
will be able to redistribute more than selective welfare states that target their
benefits at the poor only. The middle class is willing to contribute if, on the
distribution side, they can get a slice of the cake as well (Korpi & Palme, 1998;
Van Oorschot, 2013).
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Appendix
Table A1
Descriptive Information per Country
Country N Missing data per dependent variable
Taxes for high
incomes
Taxes for middle
incomes
Taxes for low
incomes
All countries 36,688 4,088 3,074 2,939
Australia 2,781 216 164 192
Canada 933 83 48 66
Croatia 1,200 245 177 136
Czech Republic 1,201 93 78 65
Denmark 1,368 81 52 68
Finland 1,189 92 70 60
France 1,824 147 61 172
Germany 1,643 184 154 139
Great Britain 930 83 80 69
Hungary 1,010 109 104 86
Ireland 1,001 52 38 32
Israel 1,345 149 92 94
Japan 1,231 217 161 189
Latvia 1,069 202 147 94
Netherlands 993 75 58 66
New Zealand 1,263 123 77 90
Norway 1,330 68 41 64
Poland 1,293 168 163 111
Portugal 1,837 294 263 179
Russia 2,407 657 588 515
South Korea 1,605 47 46 46
Spain 2,517 395 193 190
Sweden 1,194 81 68 71
Switzerland 1,003 43 28 32
United States 1,518 102 46 57
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